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COMMENTS
Administrative Bias: An Update
I. Introduction
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due proc-
ess.' 'I The necessity of a fair trial applies with equal if not greater force to
an administrative adjudication than it does to a judicial proceeding.2 Both
statute 3 and case law4 agree that due process is denied whenever bias
taints an administrative proceeding. No easy formula is available, how-
ever, to determine what constitutes bias.
The law of administrative bias has been affected by recent devel-
opments that have broken new ground and solidified old principles. These
changes, however, have not been organized into a complete and manage-
able framework. 5 This structure is necessary to provide guidance for
determining the procedures that may be used to recuse the administrative
adjudicator, the types of conduct that constitute administrative bias, and
the remedies available to a party affected by bias. Only in this way can
the administrative litigant's due process rights be fully protected.
II. Disqualification of Adjudicators: Judicial v. Administrative
Procedures
Currently two principal federal procedural models are used for the
1. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
2. NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
[A] fair trial by an unbiased and non-partisan trier of the facts is of the essence
of the adjudicatory process as well when the judging is done in an administrative
proceeding by an administrative functionary as when it is done in a court by a
judge. Indeed, if there is any difference, the rigidity of the requirement that the
trier be impartial and unconcerned in the result applies more strictly to an adminis-
trative adjudication where many of the safeguards which have been thrown around
court proceedings have, in the interest of expedition and a supposed administrative
efficiency been relaxed.
Id. at 563.
3. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 56(b) (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
66, § 454.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
4. See Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d
754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
5. Although administrative bias has been the subject of commentary, it has not been
examined recently. See generally DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.01-.06 (1958);
Note, The Disqualification of Administrative Officials, 41 COLM. L. REV. 1384 (1941);
Note, Administrative Law-Bias of Trial Examiner and Due Process of Law, 30 GEo. L.J.
54 (1941); Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 216
(1964); Note, Disqualification of Administrative Officials for Bias, 13 VAND. L. REV. 712
(1960).
recusal of adjudicators. The first is used to disqualify federal district
judges;6 the second is the procedure established in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)7 for disqualification of administrative officials.
Under the federal judicial procedure, a judge must remove himself
from a case upon the filing of a timely and sufficient affidavit of bias.
8
Before recusal, however, the judge is allowed to determine the legal
sufficiency of the facts allegedly warranting disqualification. 9 If the
affidavit is legally sufficient, the judge must withdraw. 10 The judge is not
entitled to inquire into the truth of the facts alleged.11
The APA 12 provides a different method for disqualifying ad-
judicators. Under the APA, the filing of a timely and sufficient affidavit
of personal interest or other bias is also required. 13 Unlike the procedure
for federal judges, the mere legal sufficiency of the affidavit does not
require the administrative adjudicator to withdraw.' Assuming the ad-
judicator does not voluntarily withdraw, the agency must hold a hearing
and make a decision on the merits of the affidavit. "
A comparison of the two procedures indicates that it is much simpler
to disqualify a federal judge than an administrative adjudicator. For
judicial disqualification, all that is needed is an affidavit that states facts
legally sufficient to warrant recusal. The APA procedure, however, goes
further by requiring a finding by the agency that the allegations warrant
disqualification. Since both procedures adequately assure due process,
the principal distinction is the method of effecting this goal.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
7. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) provides,
Whenever a party, to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear
such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the
term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for
failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any
case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is
made in good faith.
9. Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Op. Eng., 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa.
1974). According to Judge Higginbotham, "It is my duty, as the judge against whom a § 144
affidavit has been filed, to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
affidavit." Id. at 158.
10. Id. at 159.
11. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (§144 "withdraws from the presiding
judge a decision upon the truth of the matters alleged." Id. at 36); Pennsylvania v. Local
542, Int'l Union of Op. Eng., 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970) provides,
A presiding or participating employee may at any time disqualify himself. On
the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other
disqualification of a presiding or participating employee, the agency shall deter-
mine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case.
13. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589
(S.D. Cal. 1960).
14. 2 DAvis, supra note 5, at 167.
15. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970).
III. The General Test for Disqualification: Actual or Apparent Bias?
Once the applicable procedure for asserting bias has been identified,
the general test for disqualifying an administrative adjudicator must be
ascertained. Specifically, must a party prove "actual" or "apparent"
bias?
Although the APA does not implicitly require either actual or ap-
parent bias, federal cases indicate that an appearance of bias will be
sufficient to disqualify. 16 Since "our system of law has always en-
deavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness," 17 the use of an
appearance of bias test for disqualification is more consistent with assur-
ing due process than is an actual bias test, The appearance of bias test
simply requires a party to show a comment, act, or relationship with one
of the parties that can be considered prejudicial. Under the actual bias
test, however, one must unequivocally show bias. Furthermore, actual
bias cannot be easily proved without an examination of the mental
attitude of the adjudicator. Since courts are extremely reluctant to permit
a party to question an official to determine his mental attitude or process-
es, 18 the actual -bias test imposes a virtually insurmountable burden of
proof. Consequently actual bias will not be proved unless the adjudicator
admits bias or his conduct blatantly demonstrates actual bias.
Acceptance of the appearance of bias test creates possible conflicts
with the APA19 and Pennsylvania procedures 0 for disqualification. These
16. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
"[Any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased
but also must avoid the appearance of bias." Id. at 150. Accord, American Cyanamid v.
FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
In Amos, the court posited that "an administrative hearing of such importance and vast
potential consequences must be attended, not only with every element of fairness but with
the very appearance of complete fairness." Id. at 267.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also adopted the view that an appearance of bias
warrants disqualification. See Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858
(1975); Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969); In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584,
172 A.2d 835 (1961). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has for the most part followed
the view of the Supreme Court. See Department of Insur. v. American Bankers Insur. Co.,
26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 189, 363 A.2d 874 (1976); Donnon v. Downingtown Civil Serv. Comm'n,
3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 283 A.2d 92 (1971). But see Rayne v. Edgewood School Dist., 19 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 353, 339 A.2d 151 (1975).
17. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
18. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
Such an examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility.
We have explicitly held in this very litigation that 'it was not the function of the
court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary.' Just as a judge cannot be
subjected to such a scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative process must be
equally respected.
Id. at 422. Accord, San Francisco Mining Exchange v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967).
19. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970).
20. 1 PA. CODE § 35.186 (1977) provides,
A presiding officer may withdraw from a proceeding when he deems himself
disqualified, or he may be withdrawn by the agency head for good cause found
after timely affidavits alleging personal bias or other disqualification have been
filed and the matter has been heard by the agency head or by another presiding
officer to whom the agency head has delegated the matter for investigation and
report.
procedures seem to require a finding of actual bias: the APA calls for
determination of the matter as a part of the record 21 and the Pennsylvania
procedure necessitates a finding of good cause. 22 The APA and Pennsyl-
vania Code, however, define only the procedure for disqualification; the
substantive law still determines what will be sufficient to disqualify.
Therefore, an appearance of bias will constitute good cause under the
Pennsylvania procedure and will be the matter to be determined as a part
of the record under the APA.
IV. Types of Administrative Bias
Since the appearance of bias test is a very general standard, it is
necessary to identify the specific types of conduct that constitute imper-
missible bias. The four primary types of impermissible bias are interest,
personal bias, prejudgment, and legislative interference.
A. Interest
Interest was recognized as a ground for disqualification as early as
1610 when it was said that "no man shall be judge in his own cause. ''23
Professor Davis has restated this maxim as follows: "One who stands to
gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason
of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial function."
24
Three types of interest that will disqualify are direct pecuniary
interest, indirect pecuniary interest, and nonpecuniary interest. When an
adjudicator might gain financially by deciding a case a particular way, he
is said to have a pecuniary interest. Thus, when a state statute provided
that a person accused of violating the Prohibition Act be tried by the
mayor of the village, the Supreme Court held that due process was
denied.2 5 The rationale underlying the decision was that the mayor would
receive payment of fees and costs only if the defendant were convicted.
The pecuniary interest in the outcome was sufficient to disqualify. 26 It
was immaterial that some mayors could remain impartial despite a
pecuniary gain for each conviction. The Court reasoned that
[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation
to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not
21. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970).
22. 1 PA. CODE § 35.186 (1977).
23. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
24. 2 DAVIS, supra note 5, at 153.
25. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
26. Although the fees and costs amounted to only twelve dollars for each conviction,
the Court had no trouble finding the pecuniary interest grounds for disqualification.
We cannot regard the prospect of receipts or loss of such an emolument in
each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not
fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial
consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a loss by the mayor
should weigh against his acquittal.
Id. at 532.
to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and
the accused denies the latter due process of law.17
The above statement is strong authority for the proposition that an
appearance of bias without proof of actual bias is reason for disqualifica-
tion of an adjudicator because of a pecuniary interest .8 The pecuniary
benefit need not occur immediately upon decision, but if there is a
potential benefit, the administrator should be disqualified. 29
Not only will an administrator be disqualified for direct pecuniary
interest, but the Supreme Court has also recently held that an adjudicator
may be disqualified for an indirect pecuniary interest.30 The mayor of a
village had been empowered by statute to hear certain traffic offenses.
31
A major part of the village's revenues came from fines, forfeitures, and
costs collected by his court. 32 The Supreme Court reasoned that the past
revenue record "may make [the mayor] partisan to maintain the high
level of contribution from the mayor's court."-3 3 Again, the Court's
language suggests that only apparent bias is needed to deny due process.
A disqualifying interest, however, need not be pecuniary. A person-
al interest of an adjudicator based upon a relationship with a party
interested in a proceeding will be grounds for disqualification. 34 Thus, an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioner was disqualified from
deciding whether sex is a valid occupational classification for flight
attendants on commercial flights because she had agreed to take a non-
27. Id.
28. in 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. (Op. No. 104) the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
recommended that a Public Utility Commissioner disqualify himself from a case pending
before the Commission because a steam heating company of which the commissioner was a
customer had applied for a service termination, and if the application were approved it
would have cost the commissioner $2500 to convert to a new source of heat. The opinion
distinguished the application to terminate service from the situation in which a utility of
which a commissioner is a customer seeks a rate increase.
I, of course, realize that the members of the Public Utility Commission are
often affected by the results of hearings in which they participate, as for example,
in a rate case. In such cases, where all members regularly participate, the interest
of each member is that of the larger public and the individual pecuniary affect is
minimal. But in this case, where the matter affects only a limited number of people
and where the result of granting the petition would give rise to a substantial
expense on your part the situation differs substantially from the usual rate case.
Id. at 24.
29. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). In Gibson, the Alabama Board of
Optometry was disqualified from deciding a case because of a possible pecuniary gain. The
Board, composed solely of private practitioners, tried to revoke the licenses of the corpo-
rate optometrists in the state on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. Since the corporate
optometrists constituted one-half of all optometrists in the state, the rationale for disqualifi-
cation was that if the licenses of the corporate optometrists were revoked, the private
practitioners would fall heir to the business.
30. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
31. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (1968).
32. In 1964, the revenue from the mayor's court was $23,589 of a total revenue of
$46,355; in 1965 it was $18,508 of $46,752; in 1966 it was $16,085 of $43,585; in 1967 it was
$20,060 of $53,931; and in 1968 it was $23,439 of $52,995. Ward v. Village of Monroeville,
409 U.S. 57 (1972).
33. Id. at 60.
34. See Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. I, 60 A.2d 774 (1948) (commissioner
disqualified from zoning commission because his wife had applied for a variance; Wilson v.
Iowa City, - Iowa -, 165 N.W.2d 813 (1969) (councilman was disqualified from designat-
paying high office with an organization that had taken a strong affirma-
tive stand on the issues.
35
The type of relationship that will disqualify depends upon the subject
matter and the nature of the relationship. It has been held that an interest,
to serve as grounds for disqualification, must be substantial and not
remote. 36 This conclusion is predicated on the logic that a substantial
interest creates an appearance of bias, while a remote interest does not.
Deciding what is substantial and what is remote, however, is extremely
difficult. An Arizona statute has simplified this determination by specify-
ing certain types of interest that must be deemed remote. 7 The statute,
which was sustained by the Arizona Supreme Court against a claim
alleging that it was unconstitutionally vague, 38 should serve as a model to
other legislatures. 39 By carefully considering what types of interests are
remote, a legislature could simplify and make more manageable the law
of disqualifying interests. Certainly such a system of classifying interests
assures due process better than an ad hoc determination. Furthermore,
prior notice of what interests are grounds for disqualification can avoid
needless litigation.
ing area to receive urban renewal funds because he was an employee of a university that
stood to gain from the decision); Paitakis v. City Council of New Brunswick, 126 N.J.
Super. 233, 313 A.2d 804 (1974) (city council's denial of the transfer of a liquor license
warranted investigation when a close relationship was shown between a councilman and the
sole protestant to the transfer); Board of Educ. v. Local 542, Int'l Union of O.P. Eng.,
Local 68, 109 N.J. Super. Ct. 116, 262 A.2d 426 (1970) (member of Public Employment
Commission was recused because his law firm represented a party in a case before the
Commission).
35. Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1967).
36. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
37. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-503, subsec. B (1977) provides,
Any public officer or employee who has, or whose relative has, a substantial
interest in any decision of a board, administrative office, commission, or legislative
or administrative body of which he is a member or to which he makes recom-
mendations, shall make known such interest in the official records . . and shall
refrain from participating in any manner as an officer or employee in such deci-
sions.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-502 (1977) defines remote and substantial interest.
5. 'Remote interest' means:
(a) That of a nonsalaried officer of a nonprofit corporation.
(b) That of a landlord or tenant of the contracting party.
(c) That of an attorney of a contracting party.
(d) That of a member of a nonprofit cooperative marketing association.
(e) The ownership of less than three per cent of corporation for profit,
provided the total annual income from dividends, including the value of stock
dividends, from the corporation does not exceed five percent of the total annual
income of such officers, and any other payments made to him by the corporation
do not exceed five percent of his income.
(f) That of an officer in being reimbursed for his actual and necessary ex-
penses incurred in the performance of his official duty.
(g) That of a recipient of public services generally provided by the incor-
porated city or town, political subdivision or state department, commission, agen-
cy, body or board of which he is a member, on the same terms and conditions as if
he were not a member.
6. 'Substantial interest' means any interest, either direct or indirect, other
than a remote interest.
38. Yetman v. Naumann, 16 Ariz. App. 314, 492 P.2d 1252 (1975).
39. The Arizona statute addresses primarily pecuniary interest. Other legislatures
could go further by defining both pecuniary and nonpecuniary interests in terms of remote
and substantial.
B. Personal Bias
"[A]n attitude about law or policy is not 'personal' unless it involves
animosity toward a party, as distinguished from issues, or favoritism
toward an opposite party."' Personal bias "refer[s] to the mental attitude
or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litigation, and not to any
views that he may entertain regarding the subject matter involved."',
Most courts agree that personal bias will be grounds for disqualification.
Nevertheless, the manifestations that constitute personal bias must be
identified.
1. Conduct that Disqualifies for Personal Bias.- Frequently, a
litigant alleges that a commissioner or hearing examiner is biased because
that official has rendered previous unfavorable decisions. Courts have
easily disposed of this argument.
42
Certainly it is not a rule of judicial administration, that
statutory requirements apart, a judge is disqualified from sitting
in a retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find
no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer
rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because
they ruled against a party in the first hearing.
43
Failure to accept evidence proffered by a party to a proceeding has
also been deemed to not constitute a manifestation of personal bias.'
Even the complete repudiation of evidence adduced by a party does not
compel a conclusion that the examiner is personally biased.45
Nor is the questioning of a witness by a hearing examiner a denial
of due process. When the purpose of the, questioning is merely to clarify
testimony so that the record can be completed, there is no basis for a
charge of personal bias.46
As with other types of bias, manifestations that give an appearance
of bias are grounds for disqualification. Conduct that goes beyond an
adjudicator's prescribed duties, moreover, normally creates a disqualify-
40. 2 DAVIS, supra note 5, at 146.
41. Pennsylvania Publications v. Pennsylvania PUC, 152 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 297, 32
A.2d 40, 48 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 349 Pa. 184, 36 A.2d 777 (1944).
42. See NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219 (1947); Duffield v. Charleston
Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Dennison, 419 F.2d 1080
(Ist Cir. 1969); Converse v. Udall, 262 F.2d 583 (D.C. Ore. 1966); United States v.
Richmond, 178 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Conn. 1958).
43. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1947).
44. NLRB v. American Art Indus., 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Bush Hog,
Inc., 405 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949). There will be no reversal of an
examiner's crediting of evidence "[u]nless the credited evidence ... carries its own death
wound, that is, is incredible and therefore, cannot in law be credited, and the discredited
evidence . . . carries its own irrefutable truth, that is, is of such nature that it cannot in law
be discredited." Id. at 660, (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 161 F.2d 798,
800 (5th Cir. 1947)).
46. Tele-Trip Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Bryan Mfg. Co.,
196 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
ifig appearance of bias. Thus, an examiner who tries to elicit evidence in
support of a party to the proceeding is acting more in the role of a
prosecutor than an impartial judicial officer and should be disqualified.
47
If a hearing examiner threatens, badgers, and argues with witnesses,
makes statements during the hearings contrary to the facts, and cuts short
cross-examination, due process is denied because of personal bias.
48
Other conduct that has been identified as personal bias includes discus-
sing the case with the prosecutor before a hearing49 and writing a letter to
a friend requesting assistance in a boycott against the company appearing
before the adjudicator.5" In all these situations, the administrative official
exceeded the scope of his prescribed duties.
Although generally the focus is on the conduct of the adjudicator, he
may also be found personally biased because of a litigant's contemptuous
acts.51 The rationale for disqualifying an adjudicator under these circum-
stances is that contemptuous conduct "may provoke a trial judge and so
embroil him in controversy that he cannot 'hold the balance nice, clear,
and true between the state and the accused . ' ",52 The standard for
disqualification would not be actual bias, but "such a likelihood of bias
or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance
between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the
accused.",
53
It might be argued that actual bias would be a better standard for
disqualification than appearance of bias to prevent a party from benefiting
from his own contemptuous conduct. The mere fact of misconduct,
however, does not create an appearance of bias. An adjudicator will not
be recused absent some evidence in the record of a response to such
misconduct that evidences an appearance of bias. 4 Even a person guilty
of contemptuous conduct is entitled to due process.
2. Statements that Disqualify for Personal Bias.- An ad-
judicator's statement that can be interpreted as manifesting personal bias
should lead to disqualification. Generally, disqualification will result
47. Tele-Trip Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1965). "[O]nce [an examiner] does
so he becomes an advocate or a participant, thus ceasing to function as an impartial trier of
fact, and a hearing so conducted is lacking in the fundamental fairness required by due
process." Id. at 581.
48. NLRB v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 118 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1941). See
also NLRB v. Air Assocs., 121 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1941); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d
9 (7th Cir. 1940).
49. Brown v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
50. Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941). The court in
Berkshire described the circumstances as "comparable to the situation of a lawyer who has
represented a client in an endeavor to get a settlement of a claim and, before the claim is
settled, is appointed to the bench and sits in the very case as judge." Id. at 239.
51. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). Although Taylor was a criminal case, its
principles are equally applicable to an administrative adjudication.
52. Id. at 501 (quoting in part from Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
53. Id. at 501.
54. Id. at 503 n.10.
only if the purported bias derives from an extrajudicial source and not
from participation in the case.55 Therefore, an officer will not be disqual-
ified if his adverse attitudes originated in his study of depositions and
briefs. 56 Similarly, an expression of impatience with a party's presenta-
tion of evidence, 57 or a comment that a litigant's counsel is "needling
him" 5 8 will not require recusal.
Statements that show a personal bias and result from matters not
connected with the case, however, warrant disqualification. For example,
statements that evince racial or ethnic bias or that are directed at a group
to which a party belongs are grounds for recusal. A judge who remarked,
"If anybody has said anything worse about the Germans than I have, I
would like to know it so I can use it," 59 was disqualified. Although this
statement on its face evidenced actual bias, any statement that even gives
the appearance that an adjudicator is biased against a party because of his
affiliation with a particular race or group should lead to disqualification.
Personal bias against a particular party also warrants recusal. 6' In
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 61 a speech delivered before the National Congress
of Petroleum Retailers by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the FTC,
allegedly evidenced personal bias against Texaco. At the time of the
speech, a complaint was pending before the Commission charging that
Texaco had coerced its dealers into distributing Goodrich tires, batteries,
and accessories (TBA), which unlawfully prevented Goodrich's
competitors from selling such items to Texaco outlets. In his speech
Dixon said, "Many of your problems are ours because they arise from
practices prohibited by . . . statutes administered by the Commission
• . . and other unfair acts, practices, and methods of competition pro-
hibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. "62 He further remarked
that the Commission was "well aware of the practices which plague you
and [has] challenged their legality in many important cases.''63 Dixon
55. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
56. In United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), a judge was asked at a
pretrial conference by Grinnel's lawyer what relief he would grant if the government won
the case. He said, "You would do better to get together with the government rather than run
the risk of what I would say from what I have seen." Id. at 581. Since the judge's adverse
attitudes came from the study of briefs and depositions and not from an extrajudicial
source, there was no ground for disqualification.
57. Vermont Bd. of Health v. Town of Waterbury, 129 Vt. 168, 274 A.2d 495 (1970).
58. NLRB v. Federal Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1961).
59. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28 (1921). The judge further stated,
One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the
German-Americans in this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty. . .. I
know a safeblower, he is a friend of mine, who is making a good soldier in France.
He was a bank robber for nine years, that was his business in peace time, and now
he is a good soldier, and as between him and the defendant, I prefer the safe-
blower.
d. at 29.
60. See Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds,
381 U.S. 739 (1965); Jones v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 354 S.W.2d 37 (Mo.
1969).
61. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
62. Id. at 759.
63. Id.
specifically named overriding commissions on TBA as one of the prac-
tices challenged and Texaco as one of the companies charged. The court
held that Dixon should be disqualified because "a disinterested reader of
Chairman Dixon's speech could hardly fail to conclude that he had in
some measure decided in advance that Texaco had violated the Act" 64
and that he would protect the dealers from these violations.
Although Texaco is an example of actual personal bias, the court
clearly stated that an appearance of bias would have disqualified Chair-
iiaii Dixon. 65 Proof of actual bias against a party is not needed, because
any statement that casts doubt on the trier's impartiality offends due
process.
C. Prejudgment as a Basis for Disqualification
Prejudgment, the third principal form of bias that will disqualify an
administrative official, is a prejudice directed at the merits of a case and
not at a party. Prejudgment has occurred when "a disinterested observer
may conclude that [the adjudicator] has in some measure ajudged the
facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it. "66
Prejudgment of law alone will not, however, disqualify an adjudicator.
67
Furthermore, prejudgment of policy 68 and a "firm belief in the objectives
of a statute, which the official is given power to enforce" 69 have also not
been deemed improper.
Nevertheless, when an adjudicator prejudges both the law and the
64. Id. at 760.
65. Id. "[A]n administrative hearing of such importance must be attended, not only
with every element of fairness but with the very appearance of complete fairness." Id. at
760, (quoting Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
66. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
67. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). The FTC issued a cease and desist
order to a cement institute composed of seventy-four corporations to stop employing a
multiple basing point system of pricing. Because the FTC had sent a report to the President
and Congress that stated that the multiple basing point system was the equivalent of a price
fixing restraint of trade, the institute alleged that the Commission had prejudged the case.
The Court found only a prejudgment of law and not of the facts. The Court's rationale for
holding that prejudgment of law alone would not violate due process was that no "decision
of this court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process
for a judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of
conduct were prohibited by law." Id. at 702-03. The court noted that if the minds of the
commissioners had been irrevocably closed to the legality of the Institute's particular basing
point system, disqualifying bias would have been present.
In Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), the Secretary of Agriculture in a letter
to the New York Times strongly criticized a decision of the Supreme Court concluding that
he had denied a fair hearing to Morgan. When the case was remanded to the Secretary for a
new hearing, the Secretary was not disqualified because he had only expressed a view on
legal matters.
68. Skelly Oil-Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967). In Skelly, a commissioner was
not disqualified, although he had entered a proceeding with strong views on important
matters at issue. Accord, Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 20 FCC 33 (1969), in which an
adjudicator who held strong views on the concentration of control of the mass media was
not disqualified from deciding a case in which the issue was whether there was a concentra-
tion of control in a particular industry inconsistent with the public interest.
69. Pennsylvania Publications v. Pennsylvania PUC, 152 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 297, 32
A.2d 40, 48 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 349 Pa. 184, 36 A,2d 777 (1944).
facts of a case, the general view is that he should be disqualified.7 °
Prejudgment of law and facts may be shown by statements, prior contact
with the facts of a case, and press releases.
1. Statements as Prejudgment of Facts.- Cinderella Career &
Finishing Schools v. FTC7 firmly establishes the principle that state-
ments by an administrator showing prejudgment of the facts and law of a
pending case are grounds for disqualification. In a speech before the
National Newspaper Association, FTC Chairman Dixon, after referring
to Cinderella's advertisements, which were the basis of charges of decep-
tive advertising, remarked that newspapers should be "saavy enough to
smell deception when the odor is strong enough." 72 He was disqualified
because a disinterested observer would have concluded that Dixon had
decided before the hearing that Cinderella had engaged in deceptive
advertising.
73
Issues of fact and law are not always clearly distinguishable. A
recent case indicates that one may remark about a pending case and yet
avoid charges of prejudgment of the facts.74 A commissioner was charged
with prejudging a case because of remarks made during an interview with
a magazine reporter. Since the commissioner had merely quoted from the
complaint when she referred to the pending proceeding, the court found
no prejudgment of facts.
7 5
2. Prior Contact with the Facts as Prejudgment.-Prior contact
with the facts of a case can result in the disqualification of an administra-
tive adjudicator.7 6 Mere prior contact, however, is not the test for disqual-
ification.77 The amount and type of contact determine whether disqualifi-
cation is necessary.
70. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
71. Id. Accord, Sewell v. FTC, 240 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1956); Given v. Weinberger, 380
F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Va. 1974); Center for United Labor Action, 209 NLRB 130 (1974).
72. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir.1970).
73. Id.
74. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. Id. While discussing routine communications pertaining to Commission studies
and letters from congressmen and interest groups seeking action against concentration in
certain fields, Commissioner Jones referred to the Keanecott case to illustrate a point. She
said, "We have here an instance of a copper company that was actually moving into the coal
industry on its own. . . .The [complaint says] that Kennecott, in effect, eliminated itself as
a probable new entrant into the coal industry, when it went out and bought a major coal
company." Id. at 80.
The court in finding no prejudgment of the facts said,
Public expressions with regard to pending cases cannot, of course, be ap-
proved because regardless of what is said such expressions tend not only to mar the
image but to create embarrassment and to subject the proceedings to question. We
do not, however, perceive of any evidence prejudging or the appearance of it.
Id.
76. The prior contact discussed in this comment does not include commingling of
functions within an agency or person. The prior contact analyzed is familiarity with the facts
of a case gained by an adjudicator by a means other than commingling.
77. American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966).
(a) Amount of prior contact. -There must be a significant level of prior
contact to violate due process. This level of contact was found in the case
of American Cyanamid v. FTC,7  in which Chairman Dixon of the FTC
was disqualified because of his prior role in an investigation of American
Cyanamid while he served as Chief Counsel for a Senate subcommittee.
The investigation was related to the same facts and issues that were later
presented before the Commission. In addition to his involvement in the
investigation, Dixon participated in the preparation of a report that al-
leged American Cyanamid had set artificially high prices and had acted
improperly in a patent interference settlement. This "active role" did not
give "the very appearance of complete fairness" 79 and led to Dixon's
disqualification.
Since the test for prejudgment is whether the prior contact creates an
appearance of bias, an administrative adjudicator will not be recused for
insignificant exposure to the facts of a case. Thus, the participation in
studies of a number of industries, the interrogation of witnesses, and the
expression of an opinion that some of the evidence received at hearings
might indicate a violation of law do not constitute impermissible prior
contact. 80 A case by case approach, which permits consideration of the
particular circumstances surrounding the prior contact, 8' is consistent
with due process and would result in disqualification only when there is
contact that might affect the impartiality of the adjudicator.
(b) Types of contact.-There are circumstances in which even substan-
tial prior contact with a case will not result in disqualification. Such
situations may arise when a case is remanded to a commissioner or
hearing examiner. 82 Although there is substantial prior contact, due
process has not been violated because such contact is the result of the
proper functioning of the adjudicatory system.8 3 Unless the system is
defective, there can be no appearance of bias.
We do not hold that the service of Mr. Dixon as counsel for the subcommittee,
standing alone, necessarily would require disqualification. Our decision is based
upon the depth of the investigation and the questions and comments by Mr. Dixon
as counsel, as shown by the record in this case.
Id. at 768.
78. 363 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966).
79. Id. at 768. See Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (SEC
commissioner was disqualified because in a prior capacity he had directed an investigation
of Amos which led to the filing of charges); TWA v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(member of CAB was disqualified from a case in which he had filed a brief while acting as
solicitor for the Post Office Department).
80. Campbell Taggert Associated Bakeries, Inc., 62 FTC 1494 (1963). See also Safe-
way v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966).
81. Since personal bias can be evidenced by so many different forms of statements
and conduct, a statutory definition of personal bias is necessarily general. Thus, a case-by-
case approach is necessary. In contrast, interest can be specifically defined by statute
because it is more objective and does not depend upon subjective statements or conduct.
82. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219 (1947). This is always insufficient
grounds for a charge of personal bias. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
83. For other cases in which substantial prior contact with the facts of a case did not
3. Press Releases as Prejudgment.- Press releases issued by
agencies are commonly attacked as prejudgments. In FTC v. Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, ' it was held that a factual news release did
not violate due process. The release stated that the FTC, "having reason
to believe" that the Cinderella Career and Finishing School had violated
the law by engaging in unfair practices and advertising in conducting its
business, was initiating a complaint against Cinderella "in the public
interest.' 85 The release referred to the complaint, gave specific details,
and quoted from the allegedly deceptive advertisements. 86 Cinderella
argued that the release constituted a prejudgment by the Commission and
put extreme pressure on Commission members to vindicate themselves by
justifying the publicized charges.87 The court noted that the complaint
was part of the public record and that the Commission had authority to act
in the public interest "to alert the public to suspected violations of the law
by factual press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to
believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by the
Act which have resulted in the initiation of action by the Commission."
88
The court further posited that the press release avoided any appearance of
prejudgment by "emphasiz[ing] that the issuance of a complaint simply
marks the initiation of a formal proceeding in which the charges in the
complaint will be ruled upon after a hearing and on the record." 89
Although no court has overturned a press release procedure for
violating due process, such procedures have been subjected to judicial
criticism. In N. Sims Organ Co. v. SEC 9° the court criticized a notice of
proceedings declaring that members of a commission staff had informa-
tion tending to show that a certain company had violated antifraud
provisions, but found no prejudgment. If an agency press release were to
disqualify, see Exxon Corp., 85 FTC 864 (1975) (commissioner had previously participated
in case at appellate level but had not investigated the evidentiary facts of the case); Pepsico,
Inc., 83 FTC 1298 (1973) (commission was not disqualified because it asked for a temporary
restraining order alleging there was a reasonable probability that a violation of law had
occurred); Augion-Unipolar Corp., 44 SEC 438 (1970) (commission not disqualified by its
participation in suit brought by respondent in federal court litigating the same facts and
issues); Susquehanna Corp., 44 SEC 379 (1970) (participation as amicus curiae in federal
court involving same issues did not disqualify commission).
84. 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
85. Id. at 1309.
86, Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1314.
89. Id. at 1316. For other cases upholding press releases against charges of prejudg-
ment of the facts, see, Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1959); Resort Car
Rental, 83 FTC 234 (1973); Haight Co., 44 SEC 481 (1971); In re Bowman & Reynolds, 23
Agri. Dec. 1065 (1964).
90. 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961). The court found the press release could be interpreted
as showing prejudgment, but believed that was not the SEC's intent. The court found no due
process violation, but said, "we do not think the notice was a very good kind of notice for a
government body to issue." Id. at 81.
state that a company had violated an act, due process would be denied. 9 1
Such statements are tantamount to a finding of guilt before the hearing on
the merits, and, therefore, violate due process.
To avoid a due process challenge, an agency should couch any
statements about pending proceedings in terms of what the complaint
alleges and emphasize that these are only charges. Once an agency states
that an action is being instituted because the law has been violated, it is
exposing itself to charges of prejudgment.
92
D. Legislative Interference
"[P]rivate litigants [have a right] to a fair trial and, equally im-
portant, . . . [a] right to the appearance of impartiality, which cannot be
maintained unless those who exercise the judicial function are free from
powerful external influences." 9 3 Legislative interference in the adminis-
trative decision-making process is an external influence that taints a
proceeding and denies a litigant due process. Legislative interference may
stem from acts done within or outside the formal workings of a legisla-
ture.
In Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 94 the court found an impermissible legisla-
tive interference from within the formal workings of the legislature. A
Senate subcommittee chaired by Estes Kefauver conducted hearings to
review the FTC's handling of the Pillsbury case. The senators questioned
two commissioners about how and why they had reached their initial
decision, gave their interpretation of the applicable statute, and criticized
the Commission for having reached the "wrong" decision. 95 During the
hearing Chairman Howry disqualified himself from the case because of
91. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959). The court in Gilligan
might have held that the press release constituted prejudgment if it had not found a waiver
because of an untimely objection. -[T]he Commissioner's reputation for objectivity and
impartiality is opened to challenge by the adoption of a procedure from which a distinterest-
ed observer may conclude that it has in some measure ajudged the facts as well as the law of
a particular case in advance of hearing it." Id. at 468-69.
92. Quoting from the complaint in issuing a press release will not completely insulate
an agency from charges that it has deprived a litigant of due process. In addition to
prejudgment, there are other grounds upon which to invalidate a press release.
If a press release is knowingly false, due process would be denied. FTC v. Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Due process would also be
denied if the press release does not fairly and accurately summarize the complaint. Id. A
discriminatory exercise of commission authority to make news releases would also invali-
date a press release. Id.
Judge Robinson in a concurring opinion in Cinderella suggested that a press release may
be invalidated because it denies equal protection of the law if it is arbitrarily issued or if the
public has no real interest in the subject matter of the release. In Ciliderella, Judge Robinson
found no denial of equal protection because the release was issued according to a procedure
that the FTC had followed for over fifty years. He also found that the public had a legitimate
interest in being warned of possible instances of deceptive advertising. By necessary
implication, an agency that arbitrarily issues press releases without reference to an estab-
lished procedure or without concern for the public interest may run afoul of the equal
protection clause.
93. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966).
94. Id.
95. Id.
the nature of the questioning. Another commissioner and a future
commissioner who were present at the hearings were subsequently dis-
qualified because the subcommittee "sacrificed the appearance of impar-
tiality-the sine qua non of American judicial justice-in favor of some
short-run notions regarding the Congressional intent underlying an
amendment to a statute."
96
An administrative decision may be invalidated even though the
administrator who is subjected to formal legislative interference is not the
actual decision-maker. In Koniag v. Kleppe97 the person affected was
legal counsel and the principal advisor to an agency secretary who was
the decision-maker. The court found a denial of due process because the
advisor was subjected to a detailed probing of pending cases by a Senate
subcommittee and a discussion of his position on the interpretation of the
affected act. Furthermore, the chairman of the subcommittee had stated
"that he was obliged to confess that he had doubts as to whether the law
was being properly carried out." 98
Strong legislative pressure on decision-makers outside the formal
workings of a legislature can also result in a denial of due process.
Threatening to cut off appropriations if a certain decision is not reached"
and informing adjudicators that high government officials seek a certain
decision0 0 are impermissible interferences in the administrative ad-
judicatory process. It is uncertain whether the challenging party must
prove not only the existence of external pressure but also that the pressure
was a consideration in the decision.10 1 The preferable view is that the
presence of a factor that might become an improper consideration in a
decision creates an appearance of bias that should invalidate a decision
regardless of any evidence of actual influence. If evidence were required
that the interference was a factor in the decision, the standard would then
become actual bias rather than the appearance of bias, which the federal
courts consider sufficient to constitute a denial of due process.1
°2
Although an appearance of bias is all that is needed to disqualify,
there still must be an act that is capable of interfering with the adjudica-
96. Id. at 964.
97. 405 F. Supp. 1360 (D.D.C. 1975).
98. Id. at 1371.
99. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Congress-
man Natcher stated publicly that he would do everything he could to withhold congressional
appropriations for the District of Columbia rapid transit system until the district complied
with the statute. The court in finding an improper intrusion into the adjudicatory process
said, "Even if the Secretary had taken every formal step required by every applicable
statutory provision, reversal would be required, . . . because extraneous pressure intruded
into the calculus of consideration on which the Secretary's decision was based." Id. at 1245-
46.
100. Jarrot v. Scrivner, 225 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964).
101. In D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court
mentioned that there was evidence that the pressure affected the decision. The court in
Jarrot v. Scrivner, 225 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964), said nothing about evidence that the
pressure had actually affected the decision.
102. See note 18 supra.
tory process. What has been said and by whom are important considera-
tions in determining whether there has been undue legislative interference
with adecision. For example, a Congressman who crusaded for elimina-
tion of abuses in the magazine sales industry and publicly stated that his
"investigation of magazine subscription sales practices [has] to date
produced FTC charges of deception and misrepresentation against eigh-
teen corporations," ' 10 3 did not impermissibly interfere with the adjudica-
tive process. Because there was no evidence that the Congressman had
probed the minds of the Commission on any issue in the complaint or had
pressured the Commission to reach a particular result, no interference
could be found. 10 Similarly, neither advising a subcommittee on matters
in the process of litigation 0 5 nor testifying about the administrative steps
that have been taken' 0 6 interferes with the adjudicative process.
V. Remedies For Bias
A. Disqualification
The most common remedy for bias is disqualification of the ad-
judicator and remand of the matter to the appropriate body sitting without
the recused official for de novo hearing."07 Disqualification is provided
for in both the federal and Pennsylvania administrative bias
procedures. 1
08
Disqualification and remand for a de novo hearing are required even
though the vote of the biased official was not necessary to sustain the
decision reached by the administrative body' 9 since it is impossible to
calculate the degree to which the disqualified member actually influenced
the decisions of the other adjudicators.' 10 Remand is also necessary,
regardless of any possibility of actual influence, because the participation
of the disqualified member "casts suspicion on the impartiality of the
decision."' '1
103. Hearst Corp., 79 FTC 1007, 1012 (1971).
104. "Nothing in these papers implies that even Mr. Rooney himself has reached any
conclusion on the merits of the Commission's complaint, let alone that Mr. Rooney has
pressured the Commission to reach a particular conclusion. Nor is there [evidence of]...
improper influence in the judicial functioning of the Commission." Id. at 1014.
105. Shell Oil Co., 63 FTC 2221 (1963).
106. Upjohn v. Finch, 422 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
107. In all of the principal cases in which an adjudicator was found biased, disqualifica-
tion was the relief granted.
See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
American Cyanamid v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d
952 (5th Cir. 1966); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1969).
108. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970); 1 PA. CODE § 35.186
(1977).
109. Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941); Piggott v.
Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 A.2d 667 (1952).
110. Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1941). "Litigants are
entitled to an impartial tribunal whether it consists of one man or twenty and there is no way
which we know of whereby the influence of one upon the others can be quantitatively
measured." Id. at 239.
Ill. Piggott v. Borough of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 114,91 A.2d 661, 667 (1970).
Disqualification is effective to the extent that it assures a party gets
the impartial hearing required by due process. Disqualification is,
nevertheless, inadequate because the aggrieved party is not made whole
for the time and expense lost in litigation.
B. Removal From Office
Although it is not a common remedy for bias, several statutes allow
removal of an administrator from office for the violation of a statutory
duty to be impartial." 2 Because it is such a drastic measure, removal
would probably be invoked only when there is repeated bad faith bias on
the part of an official or a flagrant instance of bias. Removal from office
for bias might also be justified when the challenging party expects to
appear before the administrative body repeatedly and it is apparent that
the disqualifying bias will continue. 113 Otherwise, removal from office is
an unlikely remedy for bias, and the challenging party would be better
advised to pursue other relief.
C. Civil Damages
A party has little hope of recovering civil damages from a biased
adjudicator. Even if the biased statements are libelous, a government
official will escape liability if the statement is made within the scope of
his employment." 4 Underlying this broad immunity is the policy that
government [officials] should be free to exercise their duties
unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts
done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume
time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to govern-
mental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit
the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies
of government."45
Since most administrative adjudicators are government officials, suits for
damages will be precluded." 6 This policy is sound because otherwise
adjudicators, for fear of being sued, would withdraw from cases for
reasons that do not justify disqualification.
Because judges have an absolute immunity for their judicial acts'
17
another barrier to suit arises if administrative adjudicators are considered
judicial officers. This exemption extends to actions under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.118
If an official is removed from office because of bias, it might be
112. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 454.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
113. One example might be a situation in which a commissioner is personally biased
against a corporation that must appear before the commission for periodic rate increases and
adjustments.
114. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
115. Id. at 571.
116. Of course, Barr v. Mateo applies only to federal government officials. State
legislatures can provide for such suits since they are not bound by Barr.
117. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1966).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
argued that civil damages should be recoverable because removal is
evidence that the official was not acting within his governmental or
judicial role. Furthermore, the threat of suit can no longer inhibit his
future conduct in office. Nevertheless, the threat of removal from office
and the resulting liability for damages could seriously inhibit conscien-
tious adjudicators in the performance of their duties.
D. Injunction
Recent cases have recognized the use of injunctive relief as a remedy
for administrative bias. These cases hold that a party can bring a cause of
action to enjoin press releases. 1 9 The use of injunctions to prevent the
issuance or further circulation of prejudicial press releases is of primary
importance because no other remedy is available. Moreover, the concerns
about inhibiting government officials that result from the threat of civil
damages do not apply to injunctions. 1
20
VI. The Effect of Waiver and the Rule of Necessity on the
Availability of Remedies
A. Waiver
"One must raise the disqualification of the trier. . . at the earliest
moment after knowledge of the facts." 121 Failure to do so has consistent-
ly been deemed a waiver of the right to an impartial adjudicator. 122 This
view comports with the language of the APA, which calls for a "timely"
affidavit of bias. 123 Timely means at the first reasonable opportunity after
discovery of the facts tending to show disqualification. 
124
Early cases indicate a difference between statutory disqualification
119. Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970). The court in Bristol Myers specifically disapproved of the following dicta of the
lower court:
The courts may no more enjoin Government departments from issuing state-
ments to the public than they may enjoin a public official from making a
speech. . . . [An] agency ought not to prejudice any persons by issuing statements
concerning matters that are pending before it. This is, however, a question of
morals or manners, rather than legal rights or duties.
Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D.D.C. 1968).
In B.C. Morton v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692 (lst Cir. 1962), the court held that Morton stated
a cause of action that, if proved, entitled it to enjoin a FDIC press release. Morton alleged
that the
Appellee did not purport to construe the Act as written, but deliberately and
intentionally attempted to add to the Act legal restrictions not justified by any
proper interpretation thereof . . . for the specific purpose of interfering with and
destroying the business of the plaintiff.
Id. at 694.
120. B.C. Morton v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692 (Ist Cir. 1962).
121. Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan School Dist., 530 F.2d 561, 574 (4th Cir. 1976).
122. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); Safeway v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966);
King v. Caesar Rodney School Dist., 380 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1974).
123. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(b), 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1970).
124. Chafin v. United States, 5 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1925).
of adjudicators and disqualification on other grounds. 125 These cases hold
that when an adjudicator is statutorily disqualified from deciding a case
the proceedings are void. 126 Absent a statutory disqualification, common
law governs and the right to an impartial trier can be waived because the
proceedings are only voidable.' 27 Since most states and the federal
government have statutes prohibiting biased administrators from deciding
a case, it can be argued that all proceedings conducted by biased ad-
judicators are void because there can be no waiver of statutory provisions.
This argument can be countered on several grounds. First, the cases
that recognize the dichotomy between statutory and common-law disqual-
ification are pre-APA and since no post-APA cases have noted this
dichotomy, they have been implicitly overruled. Second, while the offi-
cial's duty not to be biased is statutory and possibly cannot be waived, the
remedy of disqualification has common-law origins and can be waived. It
can be concluded, therefore, that the right to an impartial adjudicator is
subject to waiver, even when statutory prohibitions against administrative
bias are applicable.
The standard for waiver raises several constitutional issues. "The
right to an impartial judge or quasi-judicial officer, free from bias,
prejudice, interest, or other ground for disqualification, is a fundamental
right, protected by the due process clause of the fifth, and thus a constitu-
tional right." 2 8 If the right to an impartial adjudicator is a constitutional
right, then the standards applicable to the waiver of other constitutional
rights should apply.
In civil cases, the Supreme Court has stated that tribunals should
"not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights" 1 29 and
should "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" 130 of
constitutional rights. In an administrative proceeding in which quasi-
criminal penalties may be assessed, it can be concluded that even stricter
standards should apply. In criminal trials, the waiver of a constitutional
right must comprise "not only . . . voluntary but. . knowing, intelli-
gent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences."' 131 Unless the waiver standards applicable to
both civil and criminal proceedings are applied, the administrative litigant
will be denied an essential part of his fifth amendment rights.
125. Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N.E. 322 (1906); Stahl v. Ringgold County, 187
Iowa 1342, 175 N.W. 772 (1920); Leonard v. Wilcox, 101 Vt. 195, 142 A. 762 (1928).
126. Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N.E. 322 (1906); Stahl v. Ringgold County, 187
Iowa 1342, 175 N.W. 772 (1920); Leonard v. Wilcox, 101 Vt. 195, 142 A. 762 (1928).
127. Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N.E. 322 (1906).
128. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F.
Supp. 589, 610 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
129. Ohio Bell v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
130. Aetna Life Insur. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
131. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Accord, Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972) (right to speedy trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (guilty pleas);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel at a lineup); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial).
B. Rule of Necessity
Although it is not a remedy itself, the rule of necessity is closely
related to the remedies for bias. The rule states that "when the members
of the only tribunal with jurisdiction to act are disqualified by reason of
bias, prejudice, or interest, still such tribunal is not prohibited from
acting, where such disqualification would prevent a determination on the
merits.'"
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The rule of necessity in effect condones a proceeding that entails an
appearance of bias or even actual bias by permitting an official who
should be disqualified to sit and pass judgment in that case. Since the rule
impinges on due process, all possible options should be considered.
Among the possibilities are statutory provisions for substitute ad-
judicators and more stringent judicial review. 133
Some administrative bodies may be so specialized and their deci-
sions based upon such complex evidence that alternative adjudicators
cannot be provided. In such instances, the rule of necessity can be
modified to provide due process. This can be accomplished by providing
for more careful review of administrative action than is normally al-
lowed."M Several states have adopted this approach. 13 5 If alternative
adjudicators cannot be authorized, more stringent judicial review is pre-
ferable to permitting an apparently or actually biased official to decide a
case. The rule of necessity offends due process and its existence is not
justified when suitable options are available.
VI. Conclusion
During the last fifteen years the law of administrative bias has
developed quickly. 136 These changes have greatly enhanced the adminis-
trative litigant's due process rights. A new type of disqualifying bias,
legislative interference, was enunciated. 137 The law of bias was expanded
132. Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 408 P.2d 450 (1965); accord, FTC v. Cement
Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Marquette Cement Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1945);
Loughran v. FTC, 143 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1944).
133. In Jonal Corp. v. District of Columbia, 533 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1976), a disqual-
ified administrative body was replaced by a substitute group that had been provided for by
statute.
134. The normal standard for review of an agency's determination of the bias issue is
whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Long Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
135. See Hornsby v. Dobard, 291 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1961); Borough of Fanwood v.
Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 165 A.2d 183 (1960); Board of Educ. v. Shockly, 2 Storey 277, 156 A.2d
214 (Del. 1959).
136. Many of the major cases dealing with administrative bias have been decided in the
past fifteen years. E.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); American Cyanamid v.
FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1956);
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739
(1965).
137. The first major case on legislative interference appears to be Pillsbury Co. v. FTC,
354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
to cover a wider range of activities. 138 A significant development was the
acceptance of "appearance of bias" as the general test for disqualifica-
tion for all forms of bias.' 39 Further developments are essential, however,
before due process is fully afforded to administrative litigants. Waiver of
the right to an impartial adjudicator, the rule of necessity, and civil
damages are remedial aspects that must be further developed to better
protect due process. Furthermore, the perimeters of bias must be more
clearly defined to eliminate its operation earlier in administrative pro-
ceedings. Such a preventive measure would save time and expense at the
appellate level.
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138. Interest was expanded to cover indirect pecuniary interest and even more tangen-
tial nonpecuniary interests. Prejudgment was expanded to include prior contact with the
facts of a case and press releases.
139. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (interest); Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (prejudgment); Pillsbury
Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (legislative interference); Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336
F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965) (personal bias).

